Punitive Damages and Insurance: Are Punitive Damages Insurable - The North Dakota Supreme Court Says Yes, Despite North Dakota\u27s Public Policy to the Contrary by DeMent-Donarski, Michelle
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 70 Number 3 Article 6 
1994 
Punitive Damages and Insurance: Are Punitive Damages Insurable 
- The North Dakota Supreme Court Says Yes, Despite North 
Dakota's Public Policy to the Contrary 
Michelle DeMent-Donarski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
DeMent-Donarski, Michelle (1994) "Punitive Damages and Insurance: Are Punitive Damages Insurable - 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Says Yes, Despite North Dakota's Public Policy to the Contrary," North 
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 70 : No. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol70/iss3/6 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND INSURANCE: ARE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES INSURABLE? THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME
COURT SAYS YES, DESPITE NORTH DAKOTA'S PUBLIC
POLICY TO THE CONTRARY0
Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Kinsey (Kinsey), an attorney, paid a premium to Continental
Casualty Company (Continental), a professional liability insurer, for legal
malpractice coverage.' Anita Bjorgen (Bjorgen) retained Kinsey to repre-
sent her in a divorce proceeding.2 Bjorgen's husband was substantially
indebted to First National Bank of Crosby (Bank), and the Bank had
security interests in a considerable amount of the Bjorgens' property.3
Kinsey had a conflict of interest in his .representation of Bjorgen because
he was on the Bank's Board of Directors and owned stock in the Bank and
its holding company.4 Kinsey's fraudulent representation of Bjorgen
resulted in the assessment of compensatory and punitive damages against
Kinsey and in favor of Bjorgen.5 Continental, alleging that its insurance
policy provided no coverage for punitive damages, initiated a declaratory
judgment action to determine the extent of its coverage.6
This case comment is dedicated to Michael Alan DeMent whose walk in life was short but
enjoyable to all who knew him. May he rest in peace. The author would like to thank William P.
Harrie, Esq., for his assistance and guiidance in preparing this Case Comment.
1. Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574, 576 (N.D. 1993) [hereinafter Kinsey
2. Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 466 N.W.2d 553, 555 (N.D. 1991) [hereinafter Kinsey 11. This case is the
first in a series of four involving Kinsey. The second case, Bjorgen v. Kinsey, 491 N.W.2d 389 (N.D.
1992) [hereinafter Kinsey 1I], is beyond the scope of this Comment as it exclusively addresses the
appointment of a receiver. See infra note 6 (discussing the history of Kinsey III and Kinsey IV).
3. Kinsey 1, 466 N.W.2d at 555.
4. Id. at 554-55. Furthermore, Kinsey had previously provided legal services to the Bank and
had performed a title opinion on the real property that Bjorgen's husband mortgaged to the Bank. Id.
5. Id. at 557. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text (addressing the amount of damages
assessed against Kinsey).
6. Kfnsey Ill, 499 N.W.2d at 576. Continental provided Kinsey with legal representation in
Bjorgen's malpractice action with a reservation that the insurance policy would not provide coverage
for any damages awarded to Bjorgen for fraudulent conduct. Id. Kinsey's professional insurance
policy with Continental excluded coverage for any fraudulent conduct by the insured. Id. at 577.
When Bjorgen was awarded damages for Kinsey's fraudulent conduct, Continental filed a declaratory
judgment action. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 576. Kinsey counterclaimed, alleging that Continental
failed to act fairly or in good faith in representing him. Id. The counterclaim was dismissed by the
district court for failure to raise genuine issues of material fact. Id. The North Dakota Supreme
Court remanded that decision for reconsideration, as the trial court's decision was based on its finding
that Kinsey's Insurance policy did not provide coverage for Bjorgen's judgment. Id. at 582. The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the policy did provide such coverage. Id. On remand, the
trial court determined that Kinsey's counterclaim had no "genuine issue of material fact" and affirmed
its earlier order of summary judgment. Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 513 N.V.2d 66,68 (N.D.
1994) [hereinafter Kinsey IV]. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,
concluding that "Kinsey ha[d] failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Continental
breached a duty to Kinsey of good faith and fair dealing in defending Kinsey in the Bjorgen
litigation." Id at 70.
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Kinsey's professional liability insurance with Continental had several
exclusions. Specifically, one exclusion denied insurance coverage for "any
dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of the insured
or any partner, employee, officer or stockholder of the insured. 7
Another exclusion denied insurance coverage for "punitive or exemplary
damages or any fine, penalty or claim for return of fees."8 The policy also
contained a special endorsement form which provided: "The Company
agrees with the insured that the exclusion referring 'to any award of puni-
tive damages' does not apply to this policy."9 The trial court focused on
the policy exclusions and determined that Kinsey's insurance policy did
not provide coverage for Bjorgen's judgment.' 0 However, the North
Dakota Supreme Court focused on the special policy endorsement and
held that the policy did provide coverage for the punitive damages
awarded to Bjorgen."1
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the approach the North
Dakota Supreme Court utilized to approve insurance coverage of punitive
damages and the significance of this decision on North Dakota public
policy.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Kinsey's fraudulent representation of Bjorgen originated on June 17,
1983, when Kinsey prepared a proposed divorce settlement agreement
for Bjorgen.12 The day before Kinsey sent Bjorgen the proposed settle-
ment agreement, he contacted the Bank's legal counsel suggesting that
the Bank take legal action against Bjorgen's husband to collect on his
promissory notes.'" On August 15, 1983, Bjorgen instructed Kinsey to
discontinue the divorce action and to prepare a deed transferring all of
the property to her.14 Bjorgen determined that if the divorce action was
dismissed, the property could be transferred "without adverse tax conse-
7. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 577. This exclusion did not apply to any acts resulting in a
malicious prosecution claim. Id.
8. ld.
9. Id. This exclusion was required by North Dakota Insurance Commissioner Byron Knutson;
however, this special endorsement is no longer required. Telephone interview with employee of
North Dakota Insurance Commission (Feb. 1994). The office of the North Dakota Insurance
Commissioner does not maintain records regarding the policy endorsements it requires. Id.
10. Id. at 582.
11. Id.
12. Kinsey I, 466 N.W.2d at 555. The proposed property settlement agreement for Bjorgen
designated certain real property which Bjorgen's husband was to convey to Bjorgen. Id. Under this
agreement, Bjorgen was to receive the real property for which Kinsey previously had done the title
opinion. Id. Bjorgen was also to receive 10,000 shares of the Bank's holding company stock which
were owned by her husband. Id.
13. 1d These promissory notes were not due until December 15, 1983. Id. Kinsey did not
inform Bjorgen of the Bank's pending action against her husband and continued to periodically
contact the Bank's legal counse to check the status of its claim against Bjorgen's husband. Id
14. Id. at 555-56.
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quences."'- Bjorgen then would obtain a divorce once the property was
conveyed. 16  Kinsey agreed to prepare the deed but did not advise
Bjorgen that dismissal of the divorce action would also dismiss her s
pendens claim on the property and thereby leave her with no priority
ownership protection on her and her husband's real property.'7
On September 14, 1983, Kinsey sent a letter to Bjorgen informing
her that he could not transfer the property from her husband because it
had been attached by the Bank.' Concerned that Bjorgen's is pendens
claim was still of record and would take precedence over the Bank's
attachment, Kinsey dismissed Bjorgen's divorce case in November,
1983.19
On November 5, 1986, Bjorgen brought a legal malpractice action
against Kinsey founded upon Kinsey's conflict of interest and demanded
treble damages for attorney deceit.20 The jury found that Kinsey
breached his professional duty to Bjorgen and awarded her $172,000 in
compensatory damages.2' Furthermore, the jury found Kinsey guilty of
fraud or malice and awarded Bjorgen $100,000 in punitive damages.
2 2
The trial court trebled the compensatory damages pursuant to the rele-
vant statute regarding the misconduct of an attorney,2 but disallowed the
15. ICL at 556.
16. Id.
17. K nscy I, 466 N.W.2d at 556. Bjorgen would not be a priority creditor because the Bank's
attachment of the Bjorgens' property would take precedence over any right Bjorgen had to the
property through the divorce judgment. Id. Bjorgen requested the deed from Kinsey again on
September 9, 1983. Id. On September 14th, the Bank notified Kinsey that it had obtained a writ of
attachment on Bjorgens' real property. Id
18. Id.
19. Id In October, 1984, Bjorgen, not yet aware of Kinsey's fraudulent conduct, requested
Kinsey to reinstate her divorce action. Id. Immediately following Bjorgen's divorce hearing on
December 18, 1984, Kinsey informed Bjorgen that he owned a substantial interest in the Bank and
requested that Bjorgen sign a quitclaim deed to the Bank. Id The Bank's legal counsel had
previously requested that Kinsey ask Bjorgen for a waiver of her right of redemption. Id
20. Id. at 557. The North Dakota Century Code defines deceit as:
1. The suggestion as a fact of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be
true;
2. The assertion as a fact of that which is not true by one who has no reasonable ground
for believing it to be true;
3. The suppression of a fact by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information
of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact; or
4. A promise made without any intention of performing.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-02 (1987).
21. Kinsey 1, 466 N.W.2d at 557.
22. Id.
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-13-08 (1991).
Every attorney who:
1. Is guilty of any deceit or collusion or consents to any deceit or collusion with intent to
deceive the court or any party;
2. Willfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; or
3. Willfully receives any money or other property for or on account of any money or debt
which he has not laid out or become answerable for, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
and in addition forfeits to the party injured treble damages to be recovered in a civil
action.
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punitive damage award, holding that the allowance of both treble dam-
ages and punitive damages for the same acts would result in a duplicative
recovery.24
After Bjorgen's professional malpractice action against Kinsey, Con-
tinental initiated a declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of
its coverage.2' The lower court concluded that the insurance policy was
unambiguous and therefore, Kinsey had no coverage under the policy
because the policy excluded coverage for fraudulent conduct, even
though the special endorsement allowed coverage of punitive damages. 6
In the alternative, the lower court stated that even if the insurance policy
was ambiguous, "insurance coverage for punitive damages is contrary to
the public policy of this state."27
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
the insurability of Kinsey's fraudulent conduct which resulted in an award
of punitive damages.28 On April 27, 1993, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that Continental's insurance policy with Kinsey was ambigu-
ous.2 9 Applying the doctrine of contract of adhesion, the court found that
the policy provided coverage for punitive damages, up to the $250,000
policy limits. 30 However, the policy did not provide coverage for actual or
compensatory damages which arose from Kinseys fraudulent conduct
because the policy endorsement allowing insurance coverage only applied
to an award of punitive damages.3' The North Dakota Supreme Court
found that Continental had a right of indemnification from Kinsey for the
I&
24. Kinsey 1, 466 N.W.2d at 561.
25. Kinsey 11, 499 N.W.2d 576.
26. 1& Under Kinsey's professional liability policy, Continental agreed to pay "all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages: 1. arising from the performance of
professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a lawyer. . . because of an act or omission
of the insured or any other person or firm for whose act or omission the insured is legally responsible
.... I at 577. Kinsey's insurance policy contained several exclusions from coverage. See supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text (identifying the language of the relevant exclusions). However, the
policy contained a special endorsement which provided that the exclusion of punitive or exemplary
damages from coverage did not apply to that specific policy. See supra note 9 and accompanying text
(addressing the specific language of this special policy endorsement).
27. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 576. The lower court did not give an explanation as to why it
disregarded the special policy endorsement, nor did it address how or why insurance coverage of
punitive damages is contrary to public policy. Id
28. Id. at 574.
29. 1d. at 579. The policy's special endorsement purported to insure punitive damages.
However, a finding of oppression, fraud, or malice is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1976). As a result, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
the exclusion from insuring "dishonest or fraudulent" conduct created an ambiguity because it was
inconsistent with the coverage for punitive damages. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 579.
30. Id. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (analyzing the doctrine of contract of
adhesion).
31. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 579.
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punitive damages because Kinsey's liability was a consequence of his
intentional fraud and deceit.
32
On May 21, 1993, Continental filed a Petition for Rehearing which
requested that the North Dakota Supreme Court clarify its opinion as to
whether punitive damages are insurable under North Dakota law.as On
May 26, 1993, the North Dakota Supreme Court denied Continental's
Petition for Rehearing. Consequently, Kinsey III appears to be the con-
ception of insurance coverage for punitive damages in the state of North
Dakota.
III. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND INSURANCE
A. NORTH DAKOTA PUNITIVE DAMAGE REQUIREMENTS
North Dakota is among the majority of states which allow an award
of punitive damages in tort actions.' North Dakota also allows an award
32. Id. at 576-77.
33. Petition for Rehearing at 1, Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 NAV.2d 574 (N.D.
1993) (Nos. 920288 & 920252).
34. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp. 1993) (repealing and amending N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03-07 (1987)). Punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded under the following
circumstances:
filn any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, when the
defendant has been guilty by clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or
malice, actual or presumed, the court orjury, in addition to the actual damages, may give
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
Id. Other states which allow an award of punitive damages in tort actions include: Alabama (See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 6-11-1 and § 6-11-20 to 30 (1993)); Alaska (See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1993));
Arizona (See, e.g., Atom REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01 (1992); 46-455 (1993)); Arkansas (See, e.g.,
Aru. CODE ANN. §§ 16-64-130, 23-89-209 (Michie Supp. 1993)); California (See, e.g., CAL. CVL
CODE § 3294 (West 1994)); Colorado (See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1987));
Connecticut (See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991)); Delaware (See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1989)); Florida (See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72-73 (West 1994) and
§ 768.21 (West 1986 and Supp. 1994)); Georgia (See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1993));
Hawaii (See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 431:10-240 (1988)); Idaho (See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1604
(1987)); Illinois (See., e.g., IL. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, 5/2-604.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993)); Indiana (See, e.g.,
Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135 (1988)); Iowa (See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1 (Vest Supp. 1993)); Kansas (See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (1992)); Kentucky (See,
e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.184 and § 411.186 (1993)); Maine (See, e.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494
A.2d 1353 (1985)); Maryland (See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRoc. § 10-913 (1993)); Min-
nesota (See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1994)); Mississippi (See, e.g., Fowler
Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 141 So.2d 226 (1962)); Missouri (See e.g., McClellan v. Highland Sales &
Ins. Co., 484 S.W.2d 239 (1972)); Montana (See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (1993)); Nevada
(See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.010 (1993)); New Jersey (See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58c-5 (West
1994)); New Mexico (See, e.g., Samedan Oil Corp. v. Neeld, 577 P.2d 1245 (1978)); New York (See,
e,g., N.Y. Cv. Pac. L. & R. § 8701 (McKinney 1994)); North Carolina (See, e.g., Newton v. Stan-
dard Fire Ins. Co., 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976)); Ohio (See, e.g., OHIO RE . CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (1991));
Oklahoma (See, e.g., OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1994)); Oregon (See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT.
§ 41.315 (1992)); Pennsylvania (See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088 (1985));
Rhode Island (See., e.g., Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242 (1984)); South
Carolina (See., e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-69-210 (Law Co-op 1991)); South Dakota (See, e.g., S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987)); Tennessee (See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-201
(1993)); Texas (See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.004-.008 (West 1990)); Utah (See,
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1993)); Vermont (See, e.g., Furno v. Pignona, 522 A.2d 746 (1986));
Virginia (See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-38.1 (Michlie 1987)); West Virginia (See, e.g., Smith v.
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of punitive damages in wrongful death actions.- However, punitive dam-
ages generally are not recoverable in breach of contract actions,36 nor in
actions against governmental entities.37 The conduct required for an
award of punitive damages in North Dakota is oppression, fraud, or mal-
ice, actual or presumed.38 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated
that intentional or willful conduct alone does not satisfy the conduct
required for an award of punitive damages.39 There must also be clear
evidence of oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct to satisfy such an
award.
40
B. NORTH DAKOTA INSURANCE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
The North Dakota Constitution is silent on the issue of insurance
coverage for punitive damages.41 Furthermore, the North Dakota Legis-
lature has never specifically addressed the issue of insurability of punitive
damages; however, it has identified general types of interests and events
which are insurable.42
In 1943, the North Dakota Legislature enacted a statute which exon-
erated insurance companies from liability for the willful acts of their
insured.43 In Hins v. Heer,4 the North Dakota Supreme Court inter-
preted this statute as an express statement of public policy that "an
insured cannot be indemnified for losses caused by his own willful acts."
4 5
Perry 359 S.E.2d 624 (1987)); Wisconsin (See, e.g., Jeffers v. Nysse, 297 N.W.2d 495 (1980)); Wyo-
ming (See, e.g., Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Criego, 741 P.2d 1106 (1987)).
35. See Puppe v. A.C. and S., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.D. 1990) (finding that punitive
damages are recoverable in wrongful death actions).
36. N.D. CErr. CODE § 32-03.2-11. See also Campbell v. Wishek Pub. Sch. Dist., 150 N.W.2d
840, 842 (N.D. 1967) (prohibiting punitive damage awards in cases involving claims for breach of
contract). Punitive damages may be awarded only if the breach of contract action is permeated with
other wrongs and if the insured party elects to waive the contract issues and recover in tort. Id.
37. N.D. CENr. CODE § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1993) (limiting the liability of political subdivisions).
38. See supra note 34 (quoting the punitive damages statute).
39. Bismarck Realty Co. v. Folden, 354 N.W.2d 636, 643 (N.D. 1984).
40. hi North Dakota's conduct requirement for punitive damages is representative of the states
with the strictest conduct requirements. RICHARD L. BLATr, ET AL., PUNrrIv DAMAGES: A STATE-
BY-STATE GUIDE TO Lv AND PRAcrxcE § 8.44 at 265 (1991). For additional state-by-state analysis
of punitive damages, see id at ch. 8.
41. Knsey 111, 499 N.W.2d at 580.
42. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-11 (1989) (stating that any contingent or unknown event
which creates a liability against a person who has an insurable interest may be insured against, with
the exception of insuring the drawing of a lottery).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-06-04 (1943) (repealed and reenacted as § 26.1-32-04 (1989))
(exonerating insurer from liability for losses caused by insured's willful acts, but charging insurer for
losses caused by insured's negligence).
44. 259 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1977).
45. Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D. 1977). In Heer, the trial court held that Heer had
'wantonly, willfully, and maliciously committed a physical assault upon Hins" and awarded $20,000
compensatory damages and $5,000 punitive damages. Id. The trial court concluded that Heer's
insurance policy did not provide coverage for his acts as a matter of law because the insurance policy
excluded coverage for injury or damage which the insured expected or intended. Iat at 39. The
North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the insurance exclusion of bodily injury or property damage
642
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Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that insuring
against liability arising directly from one's own willful act(s) is contrary to
public policy.46 The court has also explained that "[t]he reason for award-
ing punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer in order to deter him,
and others, from repetition of the wrongful conduct."' In addition, the
North Dakota Century Code provides that contracts which exempt a per-
son from responsibility for fraudulent or willful injuries to others are
against "the policy of the law."
48
It is important to note, however, that North Dakota does not have a
statute which specifically addresses contracts which insure against an
award of punitive damages. Furthermore, very little North Dakota case
law has addressed this issue.
One case which did address insurance and punitive damages is Yesel
v. Watson49 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that a
surety is not liable for a punitive damages award against its principal.50 In
making its decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer.5' There-
fore, the court held that the state bonding fund was not required to pay
the punitive damages award.52 Although Yesel v. Watson seems to
strongly disfavor another party's payment of a punitive damage award for
the wrongdoer, Yesel is limited in its applicability because it involved a
state bonding fund and not a private insurance contract.5
North Dakota has no other state appellate decision addressing the
issue of insurability of punitive damages. Therefore, it is helpful to
examine case law addressing insurance contracts in general. The North
Dakota Supreme Court has given substantial weight to the reasonable
expectations and intentions of the parties in interpreting the terms of cov-
erage of an insurance policy, 4 In interpreting the terms of an insurance
which the insured expected or intended was applicable and therefore, Heer's conduct was not
insured. Id. at 40.
46. See, e.g., Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 N.W.2d 508, 512 (N.D. 1952) (stating that
insurance which indemnifies a perpetrator for his criminal acts is void and against public policy).
47. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63, 68 (N.D. 1981).
48. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (1987) (stating that any contract for the exemption of
responsibility for one's own fraud or willful injury, or for a willful or negligent violation of the law, is
against "the policy of the law"). Sections 9-08-02 and 26.1-32-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
both prohibit contracts which insure the willful acts of someone who causes injury to others. Kinsey
11, 499 N.W.2d at 581.
49. 226 N.W. 624 (N.D. 1929).
50. Yesel v. Watson, 226 N.W. 624, 625 (N.D. 1929) (finding that the state bonding fund was not
liable for a punitive damages award when a police officer falsely arrested and assaulted the plaintiff).
51. Id. at 626. "The very purpose said to underlie the recovery of exemplary damages is to
punish the wrongdoer, and, were its recovery not attended by this supposed virtue, punitive damages
would long since have fallen into the discard with other forms of punitory remedies." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lovas v. St. Paul Ins. Cos., 240 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1976).
1994] 643
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contract, the court is "guided by the familiar rule that, as an adhesion
contract drawn by the company, it must be construed most strongly
against the insurance company."-5 The court's focus on the parties' inten-
tions and the court's decision to construe adhesion contracts against an
insurance company planted the seed for insurability of punitive
damages.5 6
C. MINORITY VIEW-No INSURANCE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
Jurisdictions throughout the United States are divided on the ques-
tion of insurability of punitive damages.5 7 Most jurisdictions which have
confronted this issue have permitted insurance against certain forms of
punitive damages, such as when the insurance contract includes specific
language allowing coverage for punitive damages.58 Absent specific lan-
guage in the policy, jurisdictions look to public policy for assistance in
determining the insurability of punitive damages5 9 Public policy consid-
erations include economic impact, loss prevention and deterrence, and
punishment.60 As of 1992, twenty-eight states allowed insurance coverage
of punitive damages and thirteen states did not.
6 '
55. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D. 1975).
56. See William P. Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages. 53 N.D. L. REv. 239, 259
(1976). The trend toward broadening the coverage of insurance was evident almost 20 years ago in
North Dakota. Id. at 259-60.
57. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Liability Insurance Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive
or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4th 11 (1982).
58. BLAiTr Er AL., supra note 40, at 76.
59. MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 56:9 (2nd ed. 1983).
60. BL.ATr Er AL., supra note 40, at 74. The risk distribution of punitive damage awards is
greatly increasing because of the widespread purchase of insurance. Id. Insurance companies are
increasing premiums for policies covering punitive damages and are denying such coverage to
policyholders who may have a particular risk of incurring an assessment of punitive damages. Id.
Higher insurance premiums may punish the insured wrongdoer; however, where punitive damages
are not borne by the wrongdoer, the insurer and probably the insurer's policyholders are also
punished. Id.
61. The following states' courts have held that insurance coverage of punitive damages is void as
ontrary toepubic policy: California (See. e.g.. Lloyd's of London v. Pac. Southwest Airlines, 786 F.
Supp. 867 (-C.D. Cal. 1992)); Colorado (See, e.g.. Universal ndem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776
(1934)); Connecticut (See. e.g., Bodner v. United Sere. Auto Ass'n. 610 A.2d 1212 (1992)); Florida
(See. e.g.. Holton v. McCutc-heon, 584 So.2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)); Minnesota (See, e.g,
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F. Supp. 740 (D. Minn. 1989));
Missouri (See, e.g.. Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964)); New Jersey (See, e.g., Variety
Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 696 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980)); New York
(See, e.g., Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737 (1979)); Ohio
(See, e.g., Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)); Oklahoma (See, e.g., Dayton
Hudson Corp. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (1980)); Pennsylvania (See, e.g., Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hassinger, 473 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super Ct. 1984)); Rhode Island (See, e.g., Allen v.
Simmons, 533 A.2d 541 (1987)); and South Dakota (See, e.g., Pierre v. United Fire & Casualty Co.,
463 N.W.2d 845 (S.D. 1990)).
The courts which hold that public policy permits insurance coverage of punitive damages are:
Alabama (See, e.g., Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 189 So. 897 (1939)); Alaska (See, e.g., Providence
Washington Ins. Co. of Alaska v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861 (1984)); Arizona (See, e.g., Price v.
Hartforg Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522 (1972)); Arkansas (See, e.g.. S. Farm Bureau Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969)); Delaware (See. e.g., Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Jefferson, 628
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The overwhelming public policy concern against insurance coverage
of punitive damages is that the wrongdoer will not be punished for what
he or she has done. 2 By shifting the punishment to the insurance com-
pany, punitive damages fail in their purpose to punish the actor and to
deter others from committing similar conduct in the future.
3
The most significant case in support of the minority rule that disal-
lows insurance for punitive damages is Northwestern National Casualty
Co. v. McNulty.14 In McNulty, punitive damages were assessed against an
intoxicated driver, which the driver's automobile insurance company
refused to pay. 5 The Fifth Circuit applied Virginia law and held that
punitive damages were not insurable because the purposes of punitive
damages are to punish and deter the wrongdoer, and because the punish-
ment should rest ultimately on the party who committed the wrong.
66
Judge Gevin, in a concurring opinion, expressed the concern that prohib-
iting insurance of punitive damages would not deter or punish wrongdo-
ers because "[i]f the criminal penalties provided by such statutes failed to
deter the wrongdoers, I seriously doubt that closing the market to insur-
ance coverage will do so.
y67
F. I5p&. 502 (D. Del. 1986)); District of Columbia (See, e.g., Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guar.
Co., F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); Georgia (See, e.g., Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977)); Idaho (See, e.g., Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick Inc. v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (1973)); Iowa (See, e.g., Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins.
Co., 331 N.V.2d 106 (1983)); Kentucky (See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146
(1973)); Louisiana (See, e.g., Morvant v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 538 So.2d 1107 (La. Ct.
App. 1989)); Maryland (See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d
359 (1978)); Mississippi (See, e.g., Anthony v. Frith, 394 So.2d 867 (1981)); Montana (See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-15-317 (1987); First Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217 (1984)); Nevada
(See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.010 (1981)); New Hampshire (See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v.
Fish, 451 A.2d 358 (1982)); New Mexico (See, e.g., Baker v. A.J. Armstrong, 744 P.2d 170 (1987));
North Carolina (See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-72 (1986)); North Dakota (See, e.g., Kinsey I1, 499
N.\V.2d 574 (1993)); Oregon (See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013 (1977)); South
Carolina (See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-30 (Law. Co-op 1987); Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d
908 (1965)); Tennessee (See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964));
Texas (See, e.g., Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tx. Civ. App. 1972));
Vermont (See, e.g., Whitney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 467 (1989)); Virginia (See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Michie 1986)); West Virginia (See, e.g., Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d
227 (1981)); Wisconsin (See, e.g., Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985)); and Wyoming (See, e.g.,
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975 (1984)).
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. Ud
64. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). For further discussion of McNulty, see JOHN W. MORRISON,
THE INsunAILrr OF PuNrrvE DAMACES 4-5 (1985).
65. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
66. Id. at 440. Judge Wisdom, writing for the majority, noted that the allowance of insurance
coverage for punitive damages serves no useful purpose because insurance companies shift the
burden to the public through premiums, and this ultimately punishes society for the insured's
wrongdoings. Id. at 440-41.
67. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 444 (Cewin, J., concurring). Judge Gewin emphasized that a
prohibition of insuring punitive damages may result in some injured parties receiving no recovery. Id.
at 444-45.
1994]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:637
In 1983, the Virginia Legislature enacted a statute allowing insurance
coverage for punitive damages, and thereby overruled McNulty.' Never-
theless, McNulty commanded the minority rule for twenty-one years and
is still influential today'in several jurisdictions.69
D. MAJORITY VIEW-INSURANCE COVERAGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
The trend in the law is toward the insurability of punitive damages,
especially when punitive damages are vicariously assessed, as in principal-
agent situations.70 The approach of vicariously-assessed punitive damages
is referred to as the "hybrid approach."7 1 The hybrid approach prohibits
insurance coverage of directly-assessed punitive damages, but permits
insurance coverage of vicariously-assessed punitive damages.7 The
hybrid approach has been utilized to support the majority rule that insur-
ance coverage of punitive damages does not violate public policy. Even
the majority opinion in McNulty, the seminal minority rule case prohibit-
ing insurance coverage of punitive damages, noted that if punitive dam-
ages are permitted for vicarious conduct, the employer should be given
the protection of insurance. 3
The most significant case in support of the majority rule that
directly-assessed punitive damages are insurable is Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Insurance Co..' In Lazenby, the Tennessee Supreme
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-227 (Michie 1986). See also United Servs. Auto. Ass'n. v. Webb, 369
S.E.2d 196. 197 (Va. 1988) (concluding that an insurance company was liable for"all sums" which the
insured was legally entitled to, including punitive damages).
69. See City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that public policy requires the burden of punitive damages to be borne by the party against whom
they are assessed, not the insurer); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964) Istating that
allowing a person to insure against punitive damages is contrary to public policy and the burden of
ayi n suchq damages ultimately should rest on the wrongdoer); Casey v. Calhoun, 531 N.E.2d 1348
(Ohio App. 1987) stating that the legislature and the judiciary had cearly expressed a policy against
the insuring of punitive damages and therefore, any contract provision which contravenes that policy
is void); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 696 (N.J. Super. 1980) (pointing
out that a person who is able to insure himself against punishment gains a freedom inconsistent with
the establishment of sanctions against such misconduct); Hartford Accidental & Indem. Co. v.
Hampstead, 397 N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that to allow insurance coverage would totally defeat
the purpose of punitive damages); and Pierre v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d 845 (S.D.
1990) (stating at as a general rule, it is against public policy to allow an insured wrongdoer to shift
the burden of payment of punitive damages to its insurer).
70. See Rosenhouse. supra note 57, at 25.
71. BL..rr Er AL, supra note 40, at 83-84.
72. See Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934) cert. denied, 295
U.S. 734 (1935) (stating that if masters have no knowledge nor reason to know of their servants'
wrongful acts, masters should not be held liable for servants' punitive damages and may be protected
by insurance coverage). The Eighth Circuit noted that public policy is not violated by protecting a
master from the unauthorized and unnatural acts of his or her servant. Id.
73. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 439-40.
74. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964). Several
jurisdictions have followed the holding of the Lazenby case. See supra note 61. Lazenby is similar to
McNulty in that both cases involved the assessment of punitive damages against an intoxicated driver.
See Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 1; McNulty, 307 F.2d at 436. However, the Laenby court allowed
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Court reasoned that public policy is a key factor in the question of insura-
bility of punitive damages. 75 The Lazenby court examined three public
policy considerations in its decision to allow insurance coverage of puni-
tive damages. First, the court questioned the theory that disallowing
insurance coverage for punitive damages deters wrongdoers.7 6 Second,
the court determined that the insurance policy's language covered puni-
tive damages.77 Finally, the court determined that there was a fine line
distinguishing simple negligence from negligence upon which punitive
damages will be awarded.78
In further support of the majority rule addressed in Lazenby, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that the threat of punitive damages
has never been proven to deter a person from willful and wanton miscon-
duct.79 Other state courts have concluded that insurance coverage of
punitive damages is not contrary to public policy when an insurance pol-
icy clearly requires the insurer to cover punitive damages.80 In Price v.
Hartford Accidental & Indemnity Co.,8 ' the Arizona Supreme Court rea-
soned that the defendant, whose insurance company paid the punitive
damages assessed against him, would still be subject to criminal penalties
and substantially higher insurance rates.82 Furthermore, the Price court
emphasized that Arizona has more than one public policy and "[olne such
public policy is that an insurance company which admittedly took a pre-
mium for covering all liability for damages, should honor its obligation."83
The Arizona court concluded that the insurance company must honor its
obligation and pay the punitive damages.84
insurance coverage of punitive damages under the policy-owner's automobile liability insurance
policy. 383 S.W.2d at 5. The Tennessee Supreme Court looked to the insurance policy's language
and concluded that as a matter of interpretation, the policy insured both compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. The type of insurance language used in Lazenby has been interpreted by most courts
to cover both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. Therefore, policyholders with similar
insurance policies would expect to be protected against all unintentional claims. Id
75. Lazenby, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
76, I. The court determined that since the state's criminal sanctions did not appear to deter
the "slaughter on our highways and streets," neither would disallowing insurance for punitive
damages or such conduct. Id
77. Id
78. 1d
79. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 682 P.2d 975, 980 (Wyo. 1984). Emphasizing
the right to freely contract, the court concluded, "[vje will not invalidate a contract entered into
freely by competent parties on the basis of public policy unless that policy is well settled,
unambiguous and not in conflict with another public policy equally or more compelling." Id. at 979.
80. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accidental & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522 (Ariz. 1972); Providence
Washington Ins. Co. of Alaska v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861 (Ala. 1984).
81. 502 P.2d 522 (Ariz. 1972).
82. Price v. Hartford Accidental & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522,524 (Ariz. 1972). The defendant
injured another while drag racing. Id at 523.
83. ME at 524.
84. I
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Other courts have held that the "all sums" language in a policy
includes liability for both compensatory and punitive damages.,5 The
Iowa Supreme Court in Skyline Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Centennial
Insurance Co.8" considered two competing public policies in interpreting
"all sums" language: the freedom to contract versus the deterrent pur-
pose of punitive damages."' In holding that the "all sums" language cov-
ered punitive damages, the Skyline court elevated freedom to contract
above public policy reasons for punitive damages, and explained that a
wrongdoer does not weigh the benefits of a wrong act against potential
costs." Furthermore, the court explained that persons considered to be
poor risks may be punished with the substantial difficulty and high costs
in obtaining insurance coverage.8 9
The Montana Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue of
insurability of punitive damages and has concluded that insurance cover-
age of punitive damages does not violate public policy. 0 In focusing on
the requirements for an exemplary damages award, the Montana
Supreme Court noted that concepts such as "recklessness" and "oppres-
sion" have not yet been defined.9' Consequently, a defendant may be
unable to know whether his or her conduct would result in an award of
punitive damages until after the trial.92 The Montana Supreme Court
concluded that the decision of whether to insure punitive damages should
remain with insurance carriers and their customers until the law of puni-
tive damages is more certain and predictable 3 Taking an even stronger
approach, the Texas court of appeals has stated that the Texas financial
85. See Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983). The
"all sums" language in Skyline stated, "[tihe company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums that
the insured shallbecome legally obligated to pay as damages ...." Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
86. 331 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1983).
87. Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 107 (Iowa 1983). The
court emphasized the dangers of invalidating private contracts on the basis of public policy and stated
that "for a court to undertake to invalidate private contracts upon the ground of 'public policy' is to
mount 'a very unruly horse, and when you once get astride it you never know where it will carry
you.'" Id. at 109 (quoting Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Or. 1978)).
88. Skyline, 331 N.W.2d at 109. The court explained that "we doubt that ordinary potential
tortfeasors make calculations to determine if the expected benefits of a harmful act are outweighed by
the potential costs of punitive damages, insured or uninsured." Id.
89. Id A Maryland court pointed out that denying insurance coverage of punitive damages
could jeopardize small businesses whose owners suffered punitive damages awards in malicious
prosecution actions wherein the business owners acted in good faith. First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359 (Md. 1978). See infra notes 106-107 and accompanying text (addressing
Continental's malicious prosecution policy language).
90. First Bank v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 679 P.2d 1217, 1218 (Mont. 1984).
91. Id. at 1222.
92. Id. This is because the judge or jury must first determine if the defendant's conduct was
reckless or oppressive. Id.
93. Id. at 1223. Oregon courts have speculated that disallowance of coverage might lead to the
financial ruin of a professional person, wage earner, housewife, or retired person. Harrell v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013 (Or. 1977).
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responsibility statute requires insurance companies to provide coverage
for all liability imposed by law, which includes punitive damages.94
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Kinsey III, which followed the majority rule and allowed insurance
coverage of punitive damages, marked a major departure from North
Dakota statutory law which forbids the insuring or exonerating of fraudu-
lent conduct.95 The majority in Kinsey III found that there were at least
two different interpretations96 to Continental's insurance policy with Kin-
sey, making the policy ambiguous.97 The court applied the doctrine of
contract of adhesion and determined that the policy should be construed
in the light most favorable to the insured.98
According to the majority, the ambiguities in the insurance policy
arose from the fraudulent conduct exclusion and the express policy
endorsement waiving the punitive damages exclusion. 9 The first possible
interpretation identified by the majority was that the policy excluded cov-
erage for any damages arising from Kinsey's fraudulent conduct.'0° This
interpretation would relieve Continental from any obligation to pay
because Kinsey's conduct was found to be fraudulent.101 The other possi-
ble interpretation was that the policy endorsement expressly waived the
punitive damages exclusion and therefore, would obligate Continental to
pay Kinsey's punitive damages. 10 2  Under the doctrine of contract of
adhesion, the majority chose the latter interpretation because it was most
favorable to the insured, given the policy's ambiguity.
°3
Contrary to the majority's determination that the policy was ambigu-
ous, Justice Levine found Continentals insurance policy with Kinsey to
94. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(interpreing Tex. INS. CODE ANN., arts. 5.06, 5.35 (allowing insurance coverage for punitive
damages)).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (1989) (exonerating insurer for losses caused by insured's
willful acts, but charging insurer for losses caused by insured's negligence).
96. The court applied State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235 (N.D.
1992), and found two alternative interpretations to Kinsey's insurance contract. Kinsey 11, 499
N.w.2d at 579. The LaRoque court defined an ambiguous contract as one where reasonable
arguments as to a contract's meaning can be made in support of contrary positions. LaRoque, 486
N.W.2d at 238.
97. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 577. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (identifying the
ambiguous policy language).
98. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 577-78.
99. 1d at 579. For the language of this exclusion and waiver, see supra notes 7-9 and
accompanying text.
100. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 579. The court based this interpretation on a clause in the
insurance contract which specifically excluded coverage of fraudulent conduct. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text for contract language.
101. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 577.
102. 1d& See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for policy language.
103. 1d. at 579.
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be, in its entirety, unambiguous. 10 4  Justice Levine explained that the
majority "omits a key part of the exclusion to come up with an ambigu-
ity."0's According to Justice Levine, the policy endorsement allowing cov-
erage of punitive damages clearly applied only to a malicious prosecution
claim.' 06 However, the majority did not mention this malicious prosecu-
tion exception to the exclusion of punitive damages. In fact, the only ref-
erence to this malicious prosecution exception is by Justice Levine. l °7 In
her dissent, Justice Levine stated that the contract was not ambiguous
"because of its plain language."'08 However, even if there were two dif-
ferent interpretations to the insurance policy, Justice Levine reasoned
that excluding coverage for any punitive damages arising from fraudulent
conduct was the only reasonable interpretation because Continental's
payment of the punitive damages assessed against its insured would vio-
late North Dakota public policy and was therefore void.1°9 Justice Levine
stated, "[a] contract should be construed, if possible, to follow the law and
public policy, not to contravene it."" 0 North Dakota does not have a
well-established public policy regarding punitive damages and insurance;
however, Justice Levine suggested that sections 26.1-32-04 and 9-08-02
of the North Dakota Century Code enunciate a public policy against the
insuring of punitive damages."'
Justice Levine seemed to infer that the majority created an ambigu-
ity in order to reach a result-oriented decision. In its finding that Conti-
nental's insurance policy with Kinsey was ambiguous, the majority utilized
the "doctrine of contract of adhesion"112 as a tool to construe the ambigu-
ous policy strongly against Continental and in favor of providing insurance
104. Kinsey II, 499 N.W.2d at 582 (Levine, J., dissenting).
105. I&
106. Md. at 583. The policy endorsement in its entirety stated: "This insurance does not apply
... [to] any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of the insured or any partner,
employee, officer or stockholder of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to any such act or
omission which is the basis of a malicious prosecution claim." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Kinsey II, 499 N.W.2d at 583 (Levine, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Seher v. Woodlawn Seh. Dist. No. 26, 59 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1953)).
111. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 583 (Levine, J., dissenting). Sections 26.1-32-04 and 9-08-02 of
the North Dakota Century Code both prohibit the insuring of willful or fraudulent acts or the
exonerating of such acts. See supra notes 43, 48. Justice Levine stated that "[a] statute controls a
contrary [insurance] policy provision and the conflicting provision in the insurance contract must give
way to the statute." Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 583.
112. This doctrine is explained in Aid Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Geiger, 294 N.W.2d 411, 414-15 (N.D.
1980). The Geiger court explained: "[I]t is well-established in North Dakota that, because an
insurance policy is a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the
policy is to be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured." Id. at 414. The
Geiger court stated that insurance policies are written by insurance experts and "[i]nsurance policies
should be written so that an ordinary layperson, untrained in the field of insurance, can clearly
understand them and know whether or not coverage is afforded." Id. at 414-15. "if they are not so
written, the insurance company must assume the consequences of the ambiguity and resulting
confusion." Id. at 415.
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coverage for Kinsey.113 The majority did not apply the rule of strict con-
struction"14 because it is a general rule for interpreting ambiguous con-
tracts, whereas the doctrine of contract of adhesion is limited to
ambiguous "adhesion" contracts. 115  The majority, in applying the doc-
trine of contract of adhesion, held that the contract must be interpreted
against Continental because Continental created the ambiguity and there-
fore, must assume its consequences."1
The Kinsey III majority next turned to the interplay between statu-
tory law and public policy to ascertain any legislative intent or any public
policy regarding the insurability of punitive damages. 117 The majority
examined the North Dakota statutes which identify contracts that are
against "the policy of the law,"1 18 and which identify acts by an insured
which will exonerate an insurer." 9 The majority determined that these
two statutes, construed together, "clearly manifest a public policy of dis-
couraging persons from committing fraud or other willful acts that cause
injury to others."120 The court then compared section 26.1-32-04 of the
113. Kinsey 11I, 499 N.W.2d at 577-578, (citing Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d
663, 671 (N.D. 1977)). However, if parol evidence is offered or if application of other relevant rules
of contract indicate that the parties did not contemplate insurance coverage, the doctrine of contract
of adhesion will not be applied. Kinsey 111, 499 N.W.2d at 578.
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1987). The rule of strict construction provides that
ambiguous contract language should be interpreted against the party who caused the ambiguity or
uncertainty. Id. Although the majority indicated that they applied the doctrine of contract of
adhesion and not the rule of strict construction, there actually is little, if any, distinction between
these rules in the insurance context. Both have the result of construing ambiguous contracts against
the party who created the ambiguity, the insurance company.
115. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 579. The majority in Kinsey III contended that the doctrine of
strict construction was not a rule of last resort for contract interpretation; rather it was a rule to be
applied with other relevant rules to resolve ambiguities in adhesion contracts. I& Furthermore, the
majority noted that the parties did not assert any factual dispute as to the meaning of the ambiguous
policy provisions, nor did they present any relevant parol evidence to exhibit the parties' mutual
intent. Idc Justice Levine strongly disagreed with the majority's contention that the doctrine of strict
construction was not a rule of last resort. Id. at 582. Justice Levine stated that the rule of strict
construction should be applied last, "Just as its language tells us to" rather than applied first, "like the
majority does in fact." ia Furthermore. Justice Levine stated, '[ilt is an oxymoron, an illogical
assertion, to apply [the rule of strict construction] 'along with other rules of construction.'" Id.
116. 1d& According to the majority, Continental's endorsement form allowing insurance
coverage of punitive damages would be meaningless if the policy was construed to not cover punitive
damages when fraudulent or malicious conduct was involved, Id. at 579. The majority concluded
that to give the endorsement form waiving the punitive damages exclusion full effect, it must apply
when fraudulent or malicious conduct was involved. M
117. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 581.
118. N. D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-02 (1987) (stating that any contract for the exemption of
responsibility for one's own fraud or willful injury. or for a willful or negligent violation of thelaw, are
against "the policy of the law").
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (1989) (exonerating insurer for losses caused by insured's
willful acts, but charging insurer for losses caused by insured's negligence).
120. Kinsey II, 499 N.W.2d at 581. "These statutes foster that public policy by prohibiting
contracts which would exempt a person from being held responsible For the consequences of his
wrongful intentional conduct (Section 9-08-02, N.D.C.C.) and by precluding insurers fromindermniIfying insureds for losses caused by the insured's willful acts (Se tion 26.1-32-04, N.D.C.C.)."
d. Justice Levine. extending this line of reasoning, concluded that sections 26.1-32-04 and 9-08-02
of the North Dakota Century Code enunciate a public policy against the insurability of punitive
damages. Ia. at 583. See .supra notes 109, 111 and accompanying text.
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North Dakota Century Code with an identical California statute specify-
ing acts of an insured that will exonerate an insurer. 11 While the majority
agreed with a California court's interpretation that the statute exempts
insurers from liability for punitive damages incurred by an insured's
intentional acts,122 it nevertheless held Continental responsible for the
punitive damages assessed against Kinsey because of the ambiguities in
the policy. 3  I
Finally, the majority addressed several public policy considerations:
the public policy for enforcing contracts that do not contravene public
policy; the public policy for supporting the intentions of the parties in a
contract; the public policy for discouraging persons from committing
fraudulent acts, and the public policy against insurance companies collect-
ing premiums for coverage they do not intend to offer.1 4 However, most
of those public policies were given minimal, if any, consideration before
the majority determined that punitive damages are insurable.2' The
court recognized that it has a significant function to "maintain and enforce
contracts" which do not contravene public policy. 28 The majority also
cited an insurance treatise which contends that it is against public policy
to insure punitive damages without "specific language in the policy
extending coverage for punitive damages .. .. "127 Nevertheless, the
majority found that although North Dakota statutory law has a public pol-
icy prohibiting contracts which exempt persons from their wrongful inten-
tional conduct, the Legislature did not intend to "benefit insurance
companies by allowing them to collect premiums for coverage they do not
intend to provide." 12 The majority thus seemed to give considerably
more weight to the freedom to contract and to the prevention of insur-
ance companies from collecting premiums for coverage they do not
121. See CAL INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993) (providing that '[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss
caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or
of the insured's agents or others."); N.D. CEr. CODE § 26.1-32-04.
122. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 580 (citing City Prods. Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1979)).
123. Id. at 579.
124. Kinsey IlI, 499 N.V.2d at 581.
125. Id. The court concluded that, "Continental is required to meet its contractual obligation to
pay for punitive damages awarded against Kinsey, but it has recourse against Kinsey or these
payments, because the losses stem from Kinsey's willful fraud and deceit." Id
126. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d at 580 (citing Seher v. Woodlawn Sch. Dist., 59 N.V.2d 805, 810
(1953)). The majority in Kinsey III arguably contradicted this function, because it enforced insurance
coverage of punitive damages even as it admitted that it is against public policy to exempt insureds for
their intentional or willful acts. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 580 (citing MARK S. RHODE, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 56:9, at
16. The policy language in Kinsey's policy was not specific; in fact, the majority found it to be
ambiguous. However, the majority still allowed the policy to cover punitive damages. See supra
notes 100-103 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's interpretation of the ambiguous
policy terms).
128. I& at 581. There is no mention of the amount of the premium paid by Kinsey in the court
record of Kinsey III.
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intend to offer, than to the public policy against contracts which exempt a
person from liability for willful acts.
Justice Levine stressed that statutory law controls over a contrary
public policy provision and that "the conflicting provision in the insurance
contract must give way to the statute."12 9 However, the majority
appeared to disregard the statutory law prohibiting the insuring of willful
or fraudulent acts, and instead allowed contrary public policy to prevail
over statutory law. Anticipating the problems caused by allowing fraudu-
lent and willful acts to be insured, the majority then backpedaled from its
holding and allowed Continental to seek indemnity from Kinsey for the
losses caused from Kinsey's "willful fraud and deceit."13° The logic
behind the majority's decision to grant indemnity was that the Legislature
did not intend to "benefit insureds who cause intentional injury to others,
by allowing them to shift to insurance carriers the monetary responsibility
for their intentional torts." 131 Justice Levine recognized the majority's
assertion that it could not enforce the policy and contended that the
majority, therefore, rewrote the insurance policy to "creat[e] an extra pol-
icy remedy.' 132 This "extra policy remedy" consisted of Continental pay-
ing the punitive damages and then obtaining reimbursement from
Kinsey. 133
The majority did not assert that insurance coverage for punitive dam-
ages no longer violates public policy. Instead, the majority stated the
issue in terms of whether public policy allows an insurer to break its
express contractual promise to pay for punitive damages assessed against
its insured.' 34 The majority answered in the negative, giving full effect to
the parties' mutual intentions to contract for insurance coverage of puni-
tive damages.las
In response, Justice Levine unequivocally stated her disbelief that
insurance coverage for punitive damages was intended by the parties,
especially because the insured was an attorney who presumably would
129. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 583 (Levine, J., dissenting). See also Anderson v. Northwestern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 201 N.W. 514 (1924) (stating that statutory law controls contrary stipulations
in a contract).
130. Kinsey III, 499 N.,V.2d at 581.
131. Id. The court looked to Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505
(N.D. 1987) for this decision. Id. at 580. The Fastow court held that "a political subdivision's liability
exposure is limited as envisioned by the statute, but the full extent of purchased insurance coverage is
available to satisfy judgments entered against a political subdivision." Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 510.
132. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 583 (Levine, J., dissenting).
133. Id. justice Levine pointed out that Continental did not contract to pay punitive damages,
nor did it and Kinsey agree to subrogate Bjorgen's claim against Kinsey. Id Justice Levine
concluded, "I believe neither the majority's construction of the contract nor the argument upon which
the construction is based, is reasonable. There being only one reasonable construction, there is no
ambiguity." Id
134. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 581.
135. Id.
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know the law and avoid conduct warranting punitive damages.136 Justice
Levine contended that the majority first created an ambiguity and then
construed it against Continental so that punitive damages were insured. 31
Justice Levine concluded that "as a grand finale, the majority fashions a
solution for the problems of its own making: it converts a liability insur-
ance policy that was purchased to and intended to provide indemnity, into
a surety bond, not contracted for, and presumably not paid for."'"
V. IMPACT
The potential ramification of Kinsey III is that the North Dakota
Supreme Court will allow insurance coverage for punitive damages, pro-
vided that such coverage is expressly written in the policy. The North
Dakota Supreme Court recognized that insurance coverage for punitive
damages is against public policy." 9 However, the majority weighed this
public policy against the freedom to contract and concluded that the
mutual intentions of the parties outweighed any public policy against
insurance coverage of punitive damages.1 40 In doing this, the North
Dakota Supreme court sent a message to contracting parties that freedom
to contract has been elevated over the reluctance to exonerate a party
from liability for willful or fraudulent acts. Parties can now presumably
contract for something that may be against public policy as long as it is
expressly written in the contract and the parties intended to contract for
it.
Furthermore, Kinsey III may close the book on future public policy
considerations in relation to insurance policies. If the insurance policy is
interpreted as not providing coverage for punitive damages, the issue of
public policy will likely never be addressed. If the policy is interpreted as
covering punitive damages, the insurer will probably not be able to escape
its contractual obligations, despite the legislature's expressed public policy
concerns.
Insurance companies doing business in North Dakota should be con-
cerned about the precedent established by Kinsey III. Kinsey III cau-
tions insurance companies to clearly express terms and coverage in their
policies so that they are not held liable for coverage which they did not
intend to provide.
136. Kinsey I1, 499 N.W.2d at 582 (Levine, J., dissenting). Justice Levine expounded, "[a]fter
all, the insured is a lawyer whose stock in trade is knowledge of the law or the skill to acquire that
knowledge, and the law, specifically, sections 26.1-32.04 and 9-08-02, prohibits insuring for willful
injury and the punitive damages arising from that injury." Id
137. Id. at 584.
138. Id.




Kinsey III may also alleviate an injured party's difficulty in collecting
on his or her judgment. In Kinsey III, Bjorgen had more of a chance of
collecting her judgment from Continental than from Kinsey. Perhaps the
court recognized this in ordering Continental to compensate Bjorgen;
Continental was then given the problem of trying to collect from Kin-
sey.141 In doing this, the North Dakota Supreme Court has sent out a
"deep pocket" message that injured parties will be compensated when
wrongfully injured. The burden of collecting judgments now rests with
the insurance companies which are indemnified for the fraudulent con-
duct of their policy-holders.
The North Dakota Supreme Court does not necessarily impede the
punishment factor of punitive damages by allowing insurance coverage of
such damages. The wrongdoer is required to indemnify his or her insur-
ance company for any punitive damages awards.142 Additionally, an
insured may be liable for punitive damages which exceed the limits con-
tained in the policy. Furthermore, the insured may be punished for
wrongful or fraudulent conduct by other methods such as criminal
charges, disciplinary actions,"4 and increased insurance premiums.
Ultimately, Kinsey III empowers the citizens of North Dakota with a
significantly greater freedom to contract. Accordingly, the availability of
insurance coverage for punitive damages will probably depend solely
upon the language of the insurance policy. However, the echo of Justice
Levine's last remarks leaves a chilling impact on the majority's allowance
of insurance coverage for punitive damages: "A rose by any other name is




142. Id. Although wrongdoers must indemnify their insured, seldom are wrongdoers financially
able to indemnify.
143. Disciplinary actions were brought against attorney Kinsey for his fraud and deceit. See
Brief of Appellee at 4 & n.1, Continental casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1993) (Nos.
920288 and 920252).
144. Kinsey III, 499 N.W.2d at 584 (Levine, J., dissenting).
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